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CIVIL PROCEDURE-ABATEMENT-STATUS OF

Surr

NoMINALLY

AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHEN OFFICIAL LEAVES OFFICE-

Often an action brought against an official of the sovereign is actually
against the sovereign itself, nominally represented by the official. The
status of such a suit when the official leaves office is even today not
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satisfactorily settled. The so-called representative suit,1 while at one
time :serving a purpose, has always- been somewhat anomalous and
today is antiquated and useless.

I. Common Law Background
Every civilized political state has, as a part of its judicial system, a
principle that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent. 2
Whether or not this stemmed from the divine right of kings, it is based,
at least in part, upon the theory that the ability of governmental authority to operate efficiently depends upon there being no recourse against
it. Consequently, both federal and state courts uniformly .haye held
that the United Stat~ cannot be sued without its consent.3 The representative suit was developed as a fiction to circumvent the operation
of the principle of sovereign immunity.4 Instead of making the sovereign a party defendant, suit is brought against an official of the sovereign, not with the intent of making him personally liable,5 but to
force him to perform an official duty, which anyone holding the office
could per.form, to satisfy a claim in substance against the sovereign.
The representative suit was further identified with the official, the
nominal defendant, by the fomi of action in which the suit was usually
brought, namely, a mandamus proceeding. 6 The federal courts have
held that mandamus goes to the official, not to the office,7 so that if the
official leaves office while the suit is pending, the action abates8 as
completely as did a tort claim at common law when either party died. 9
The suit could not continue against the official because he could no
longer perform the duty requested by the claimant. The official's sue1 In this context, a representative suit, as defined by Justice Frankfurter, is an action
against a governmental officer, but in effect against the United States-not a class action
in the 'usual sense of that term. See Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15 at 28, 71 S.Ct. 93 (1950).
_ 2 54 AM. JUR., United States §127 (1945).
a The same is true as to the several states. See 49 AM. JUR., States, Territories, and
Dependencies §91 (1943).
4 Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15 at 28 and 29, 71 S.Ct. 93 (1950).
Ii An exception is the so-called Collector-suit, in which the Collector of Internal Rev·
enue is held to have committed a personal wrong in collecting the tax. For the additional
problems raised see 4 MooRB, FEDERAL PRACTICE 531 to 534 (1950).
6 102 A.L.R. 943 (1936).
'1102 A.L.R. 943 at 945 (1936); 43 AM. Jun., Public Officers §508 (1942); 1 AM.
JUR., Abatement ·and Revival §48 (1936); Secretary of Interior v. McGarrahan, 9 Wall.
(76 U.S.) 298 (1869); United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 604 (1873).
8 When an action abated at common law, it was utterly dead and could not be revived
except by commencing a new action. First Nat. Bank of Woodbine v. Board of Supervisors
of Harrison County, 221 Iowa 348, 264 N.W. 281 (1935). See also l WoRDs AND
PmwEs 65 (1940).
DPnossBR, ToRTS 950 (1941) •.
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cessor could not be substituted as defendant, because mandamus went
to the official, not to the office. If this result was once thought indispensable in order to avoid identification of the official with the sovereign, it became totally unnecessary in many instances after 1855, when
the federal government came to realize that it could allow recourse for
claims against it and still function as a government, and so created the
Court of Claims.10

II. Statutory Development
The United States Supreme Court became aware of the gross inconvenience caused by the abatement of a representative suit when
the official left office. Not only was abatement wasteful both of time
and expense, but there was also a likelihood that the plaintiff would
be barred forever by the running of a statute of limitations. In an 1895
decision, the Court appealed to Congress to take action.11 The result
was the Act of February 8, 1899,1 2 which provided, seemingly unqualifiedly, that an action against a federal government officer should not
abate if he left office while the suit was pending. Upon a showing that
survival of the action was necessary, the successor could be substituted
within twelve months after the original defendant left office. The act,
however, was ambiguous as to the result if substitution was not made
within the time provided. The Supreme Court in the case of LeCrone
3
11. McAdoa1 held that the action did not abate at all; but, if seasonal
substitution was not made, it came to an end. Prior to a judgment the
result in the two instances would surely be the same. If, however, the
official left office after a judgment in the district court had been obtained, that judgment stood. Actually only the appellate part of the
action abated. The effect of a judgment against the official after he has
10 In 1855 the Court of Claims was established with jurisdiction over "All claims
founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States.•••" 10
Stat. L. 612 (1855). 24 Stat. 505 (1887) increased the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
to include claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States and gave the district
courts concurrent jurisdiction.
11 Bernardin v. Butterworth, 169 U.S. 600 at 605, 18 S.Ct. 441 (1898).
12 30 Stat. L. 822 (1899). " ••• no suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced
by or against the head of any Department or Bureau or other officer of the United States in
his official capacity, or in relation to the discharge of his official duties, shall abate by reason of his death, or the expiration of his term or office, or his retirement, or resignation, or
removal from office, but, in such event, the Court, on motion or supplemental petition filed,
at any time within twelve months thereafter, showing a necessity for the survival thereof to
obtain a settlement of the questions involved, may allow the same to be maintained by or
against his successor in office, and the Court may make such order as shall be equitable for
the payment of costs."
13 LeCrone v. McAdoo, 253 U.S. 217, 40 S.Ct. 510 (1920).
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left office was not made clear. At least one later United States Supreme
Court decision14 and several court of appeals decisions have misinterpreted the LeCrone case to mean that the action would abate completely if after twelve months no substitution had been made.15 The
Supreme Court, however, recently has reaffirmed by dictum the statutory interpretation in the LeCrone case.16
In a 1922 decisi0n, the United States Supreme Court suggested
that the Act of 1899 be amended to include substitution of successors
to state officers who leave office while suits to which they are parties
are pending.1 7 The resulting 1925 amendment embodied this proposal, and also shortened the period of substitution to six months after
the officer's tenure terminates.18
In 1938, the 1925 amendment was incorporated by reference into
Federal Rule 25(d), the only difference being in the prescribed period
of substitution: six months after the successor takes office rather than
six months after the original official leaves office. In 1948, Rule 25(d)
was amended to embody completely the 1925 provision, but without
reference to it.19
While the statutory development has somewhat eased the harshness of the common law rule of abatement, it has not been completely
v. Philadelphia Barge Co., 290 U.S. 530 at 533, 54 S.Ct. 270 (1934).
Clawson Co. v. Robertson, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 536; Oklahoma ex
rel. McVey v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., (10th Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 111 at 114; Becker
Steel Co. of America v. Hicks, (2d Cir. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 497 at 499.
16 Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 631 at 637 to 638,
69 S.Ct. 762 (1949).
17Jrwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219 at 223 to 224, 42 S.Ct. 293 (1922).
1s43 Stat. L. 936 at 941, §ll(a) (1925). " •.• where, during the pendency of an
action • • • brought by or against an officer of the United States • • • and relating to the
present or future discharge of his official duties, such officer dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases
to hold such office, it shall be competent for the court wherein the action, suit, or proceeding is pending, whether the court be one of first instance or an appellate tribunal, to permit the cause to be continued and maintained by or against the successor in office of such
officer, if within six months after his death or separation from the office it be satisfactorily
shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so continuing and maintaining the
cause and obtaining an adjudication of the questions involved."
19 Rule 25(d), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (1948) §2072. ''When an officer of
the United States, or of the District of Columbia, the Canal Zone, a territory, an insular
possession, a state, county, city, or other governmental agency, is a party to an action and
during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor, if within 6 months after the successor
takes office it is satisfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so
continuing and maintaining it. Substitution pursuant to this rule may be made when it is
shown by supplemental pleading that the successor of an officer adopts or continues or
threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor in enforcing a law averred to be
in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Before a substitution is made, the
party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable
notice of the .application therefor and accorded an opportunity to object."
14 Fix

15 Black
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sound in its approach to the problem, as it has not recognized that in
many suits against federal officers the United States is the real party in
interest, and that, therefore, substitution of one nominal party to replace
another is at best a mere formality. 20

III. Snyder v. Buck
The United States Supreme Court in a five to four decision21
recently affirmed the dictum of the Defense Supplies Corporation
Case,22 namely, that the effect of section 11 of the Act of 1925, which
governed,23 was to abate a suit brought against a government official
who leaves office while the action is pending, if substitution is not made
within the statutory period.
The plaintiff, a naval officer's widow, sued the Paymaster General
of the Navy to recover a statutory death gratuity allowance. The suit
could have been brought directly in the district court or the Court of
Claims. The original action was for mandamus; but, since the duty
the performance of which the plaintiff sought to compel was not
strictly ministerial,24 the district court granted a mandatory injunction
instead. The Government appealed in the name of the original Paymaster, Buck, who, before appeal but after the judgment of the district
court, had been retired. After the statutory substitution period had
elapsed, the Government called to the attention of the court of appeals
the fact of Buck's retirement. The court of appeals vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with directions to dismiss the
action as abated.
The plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed
the action of the court of appeals. Justice Douglas, the author of the
majority opinion, tracing the history of the problem of abatement in
the representative suit, interpreted the Act of 1899 to mean that the
action did not abate, but was at an end, if substitution was not made
during the twelve-month period, thus reaffirming LeCrone v. McAdoo.
According to Justice Douglas, section 11 of the Act of 1925, by leaving out the phrase, "no ... action ... shall abate,"25 changed the effect
20 4

MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcnCE 5ll (1950).
v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 71 S.Ct. 93 (1950).
22 Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 631 at 637 to 638,
69 S.Ct. 762 (1949).
23 ''For the Court of Appeals during the period material to our problem had in force
its Rule 28(b) which provided that abatement and substitution were governed by §ll of
the 1925 Act." Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15 at 17, note 2, 71 S.Ct. 93 (1950).
24 34 AM. Jmt., Mandamus §66 (1941); Secretary of Interior v. McGarrahan, 9 Wall.
(76 U.S.) 298 (1869).
25 Act of February 8, 1899, 30 Stat. L. 822. See note 12 supra.
21 Snyder

448

M1cmGAN LAw Rsvmw

[ Vol. 50

of the earlier statute, so that under the new statute the action abated
if seasonal substitution was not made. Plaintiff argued that section 11
was intended to apply only to "actions brought against officials for
remedies which could not be got in a direct suit against the United
States."26 Justice Douglas held, however, that the act, by its very wording, covered any action brought by or against any officer of the United
States relating to present or future discharge of hi~ official duties, and
that this necessarily covers many actions which are in substance suits
against the United States. The suit, therefore, abated, and the plaintiff had to start anew. If a statute of limitations had run in the meantime, the remedy would have been lost completely.
The fact that there are two dissenting opinions27 in the Snyder
case illustrates how unsettled the problem is. Justice Frankfurter,
joined by Justice Jackson, made a thorough analysis of the question
and presented a common sense solution, though one probably unwarranted by the language of section 11.28 He reasoned that since this was
in substance a suit against the United States and could have been
brought directly against it, the appeal should be allowed, and the court
should merely "note as a matter of record that the name of the Paymaster General of the Navy is now Fox [Buck's successor] ...."29 If it
could be said that the statute does not apply to such a suit, the United
States should be substituted rather than the official's successor. It must
be admitted, however, that this would present difficulties where the
action is mandamus. Surely it would be desirable if Justice Frankfurter' s suggestion could be effectuated. The statute, however, purports to cover any suit to which a government officer in his official
capacity is a party, though only nominally, and sets a definite time in
which substitution must be made in the event the official leaves office.
In the face of these express provisions, it is difficult to find that the suit
merely continues as though proper substitution under the statute was
made.
Justice Frankfurter believed that the Act of 1899 and section 11
(the 1925 amendment) were intended by Congress to have the same
effect, and that the purpose of the later statute was merely to enlarge
the scope of the earlier one so as to include state, local, and territorial
officers. Under his interpretation, an action under either statute would
Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15 at 20, 71 S.Ct. 93 (1950).
at 22 and 32.
28 See note 18 supra.
29 Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15 at 31, 71 S.Ct. 93 (1950).
26

21 Id.
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abate unless proper substitution is made. This seems to controvert the
holding of LeCrone 11. McAdoo. 80
Justice Clark dissented31 on the ground that the court of appeals
should have dismissed the appeal, since Buck, the party appealing, no
longer had standing before the court. This probably meant that the
judgment of the district court would be left standing. Query as to
the effect of a judgment against an official having left office. Although
Justice Clark reached this result apparently without relying upon section 11, that statute surely applies. His conclusion logically would
necessitate a :finding that section 11 had the same effect which Justice
Douglas attributed to the Act of 1899, namely, that according to the
statute the action was at an end. Under present legislation, this may
well be the best result of the three opinions, since it is likely that the
two statutes were meant to have the same effect, as Justice Frankfurter
claimed,32 but at the same time_ the wording of the Act of 1899 seems
to indicate categorically that the action would not abate.

IV. Possible Solutions
Seeking a solution to the question, one discovers four possibilities.88
The two which will be considered :first could be accomplished under
Federal Rule 25(d) as it now stands. The remaining two go more to
the philosophy of the representative suit and would require legislative
changes.
One possible way to resolve the problem under present legislation
would be to by-pass Federal Rule 25(d) by saying, as Justice Frankfurter said of section 11 in the Snyder case, that it does not pertain to
actions in substance against the United States. A number of 0.P.A.
cases have so held, 84 on the ground that to hold otherwise "would, in
our opinion, be, to glorify form over substance and reality." 35 Justice
Douglas' broad language in the majority opinion of the Snyder case
seems, correctly, to foreclose this as a possibility without legislative
changes. Surely section 11 and Federal Rule 25(d) were intended to
cover any action to which an official is either an actual or a nominal
S0LeCrone v. McAdoo, 253 U.S. 217, 40 S.Ct. 510 (1920).
Black concurred.
32 Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15 at 23, 71 S.Ct. 93 (1950).
88 4 MooRB, FEDERAL PRACTICE 534 to 538 (1950).
84 Northwestern Lumber & Shingle Co. v. United States, (10th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d)
692; Ralph D'Oench Co. v. Woods, (8th Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 112; Fleming v. Goodwin,
(8th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 334.
35 Fleming v. Goodwin, (8th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 334 at 338.
31 Justice
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party. It is unlikely that the majority of the Supreme Court will change
its position as to the meaning of the present legislation.
A second suggested solution would be to satisfy the technical requirements of the present legislative scheme by allowing an ex parte
blanket substitution of the successor in office. Some of the district
courts have done so in O.P.A. cases. 86 The workability of this solution to the problem depends, however, upon the voluntary cooperation
of the successor and is, therefore, not likely to prove effective where the
official is generally defending actions rather than bringing suit.
Third, Congress could recognize, as it has with respect to suits before
the Tax Court,87 that the United States is the actual party in interest
and dispense altogether with the necessity of substitution, which is in
truth but a formality in "a suit to secure a money claim due from the
United States, enforced against the officer who was the effective conduit
for its payment."38 This could easily be accomplished by means of a
proviso limiting Federal Rule 25(d) to actions on claims which cannot
be brought directly by or against the United States. To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter, since the representative suit arose as a subterfuge to
circumvent sovereign immunity, there is no merit in continuing the
fiction in cases as to which the sovereign has consented to direct suit.39
In view of the fact that the suit against the governmental representative is so much a part of our system of jurisprudence, probably the most
practical solution is a compromise under which suit could be brought
against the office instead of the official.40 If, therefore, the official leaves
office while the action is pending, the suit merely continues against the
successor. No substitution of names would be necessary if the original
official was not sued by name. The courts have long held that an action
brought against a board or agency with continuity of existence does not
abate upon a change in personnel, and no substitution is needed. 41
There is no reason why this practice can not be extended to allow suit
against a,n office with continuity of existence, though held by successive
individuals. Many state courts very early recognized this general approach in holding that a mandamus proceeding goes to the office, not to
S64MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 536 (1950); Bowles v. Goldman, (D.C. Pa. 1947)
7 F.R.D. 12; Bowles v. Weiner, (D.C. Mich. 1947) 6 F.R.D. 540.
37 53 Stat. L. 165 (1939), 26 U.S.C. (1946) §1143; 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
534 and 536 (1950).
38 Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15 at 28, 71 S.Ct. 93 (1950).
39 Id. at 28 and 29.
40 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 536 (1950).
41102 A.L.R. 943 at 956 (1936); Murphy v. Utter, 186 U.S. 95, 22 S.Ct. 776
(1902); Leavenworth County v. Sellew, 9 Otto (99 U.S.) 624 (1878); Marshall v. Dye,
231 U.S. 250, 34 S.Ct. 92 (1913); hwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219, 42 S.Ct. 293 (1922).
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the official, so that a mandamus action against an official will not abate
upon his leaving office.42
That the problem of the representative suit should today be so
unsettled an issue seems strange, especially in view of the fact that
adequate legislation has succeeded in laying to rest many another common law ghost. The representative suit is so solidly implanted in our
judicial system, however, that it may be with us indefinitely. One can
hope, nevertheless, that eventually our legislators will adopt a more
realistic philosophy. Perhaps the Supreme Court through the decision
of the Snyder case will, as it has done in the past,4 3 provide the needed
impetus.
Alan C. Boyd, S. Ed.

42 102 A.L.R. 943 at 948-952 (1936).
43 The case of Bernardin v. Butterworth,

169 U.S. 600, 18 S.Ct. 441 (1898) was
largely responsible for the Act of 1899, and the Supreme Court in the case of Irwin v.
Wright, 258 U.S. 219, 42 S.Ct. 293 (1922) urged such changes as were later adopted in
§11 of the 1925 Judicial Code.

